Showing Muscle, Showing Nuclear
New START suspension and imminent delivery of nuclear weapons to Belarus.
Let’s start strategic (see what I did there?:)). New START suspension by Russia is a big deal, and not only because it means that we, basically, have no working ‘big’ arms control treaties any longer, but also because now we officially ‘de-siloed’ strategic nuclear arms control: its future is explicitly linked with the general state of relations between Russia and the US. Of course, there are other issues (nuclear arsenals of US allies, compliance disputes, targeting of New START facilities, etc.), but I believe everything can be sorted out should the general environment get normalized, even on a small scale.
Anyway, at least the limits are still there, and there seem to be no sign of either Russia or US to engage in rapid buildup - at the moment. But the information flow is heavily disrupted, which can lead to growing misperceptions.
I hardly see an easy way out, but, hopefully, some clarification on US goals with regard to the military conflict in Ukraine, as well as acknowledgement of the allied role in nuclear deterrence, can help. More of my thoughts on the subject can be found here (in Russian).
Now, nukes to Belarus. Well, there are hardly any surprises (except the unnecessary indirect link to depleted uranium munitions for the British tanks). All the formalities were sorted out some time ago, now we learned about a storage site being readied by July 1st, as well as about absence of plans to give the operational control to BY. References to the US practices within the NATO Nuclear Sharing are not very helpful. What we still do not know is what types of nuclear weapons (if any, more on that in a second) will be delivered to the Belarussian soil.
So far the guesses are some sort of air-to-ground munitions, likely but not necessarily gravity bombs, for ten (10) refurbished aircraft (Su-24? Su-25? Su-30?…) and some warheads or nuclear tipped missiles (cruise? aeroballistic?) for Iskander-M missile system. Another guess would be that it is unlikely that we will see a change in overall Russian posture with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons: the storage will probably be ran by 12 GUMO people, and the status of these weapons will be closer to non-deployed. Although, of course, the storage might be near to bases of possible operators. Somehow I believe that if the actual movement will take place, it will be very visible by design.
What it means for the broader security on the continent and beyond? Well, actually it does not change much. Lukashenko will be happy though. Of course, some areas are easier to reach from Belarus than from other parts of the Union State. As for the NPT - well, same side of the NATO Nuclear Sharing coin. But there will be bashing. Mutual bashing, and lots of blame game.
Anyway, I believe that for Russia (and China FWIW) the end goal (or intermediate goal if we are for total nuclear disarmament) of bringing all nukes back to the national territory remains relevant. But, probably, a decision was made that under current circumstances you can get more with a kind word and a gun nuclear weapon storage site abroad than with just a kind word. Also, an argument can be made that Belarus to Russia within the Union State is what Scotland is to England within the United Kingdom…just kidding. Or not.
Broad, although sometimes questionable, coverage of the issue by Russian experts (including yours truly) has been assembled by PIR-Center people here.