That Could Be Me To Escorted Out: the 3rd Term of Xi Jinping
Former President People’s Republic of China Hu Jintao is seen being led out soon after reporters are led into the main hall. One of the videos currently has 11 million views on Twitter. At least 13 videos, with different angles, at the same moment. Meanwhile in the next hour, CCTV and Xinhua (Chinese government broadcaster) show that after feeling better, Hu Jintao seated again beside Xi Jinping.
Candid. Xi Jinping highlights “Candid Communication” every time Xi and Biden set a hotline. Feel that Xi Jinping loves, fetishes the word “Candid.” Several hotlines with Biden aired 1,5 hours. Honest saying, honest for real situation and real ambition from each other. Honest request. Like the last hotline (July 2022, days before Pelosi visited Taiwan), direct-and-honest, Xi Jinping asked Biden, as a President and Democrat member party, to make sure that Pelosi did not visit Taiwan. But Biden declined. So, Xi set a candid: (massive) military drill in Taiwan straits when Pelosi visit Taiwan, at least from August 1st until August 25th
So, candid too in the Hu Jintao moment. Xi Jinping knows a lot of global media already in the venue (hall) of Communist Party Congress. Not only Chinese media and especially Chinese-Government media. Then, “escorted” incident happened. Regardless media like Xinhua, CCTV, Frontline, etc Chinese-Government media airead that Hu Jintao felt sick, but when he’s better, he was seated again beside Xi.
Current Chairman of China’s legislature, Mr Li Zhanshu, is seen taking papers out of Mr Hu Jintao’s hand, arranging it and placing it back on the table, while leaning in and speaking to him. Mr Li is then seen sliding the papers away from the 79-year-old Mr Hu Jintao, while saying something to him. Xi Jinping, seated on the other side of Mr Hu, is seen seemingly trying to get the attention of someone. A staff member walks over to Mr Xi's position, while ideology tsar Wang Huning who's seated next to Mr Li gestures at Mr Hu Jintao. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, seated on Mr Xi Jinping's right, looks straight ahead.
Another staff member comes over and stands behind Mr Hu Jintao while holding on to his chair and listening to Mr Xi Jinping. Mr. Hu Jintao wanted to open the folder in front of him, stopped by Li. Li took the folder away from him and Xi Jinping instructed to have him escorted out. Seems that Li was tasked with keeping an eye on Hu in the first place. Xi Jinping seems to explain something to the staff member while gesturing at the paper in front of him on the table. The staff nods. Li intervenes and puts the red cover page back on and exchanges a few words with the staff now standing behind him. The staff then moves over to speak to Mr Hu. While Mr Wang taps Mr Li on the arm, leans over and says something to him. Then, “escorted out” moment happened. Mr Wang Huning pulled Mr Li Zhanshu back down into his seat when Li tried to stand up during whatever that was with Mr Hu Jintao. Whatever happened to Hu, it's hard not to see “escorted video, photos” as the encapsulation of an era.
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Let move on and see more broaden issue about China, rather than “escorted (Hu Jintao)”
President Xi Jinping stacked China’s most powerful body with his allies, giving him unfettered control over the world’s second-largest economy. Xi Jinping is looking to modernize China’s military and keep up pressure on Taiwan, the most painful issue for Xi Jinping, in the coronation of the 3rd term for him. The U.S. is the side which exploits “Taiwan” to deter China in the entire Pacific. The shared imperative for conflict avoidance provides a starting point for steps to manage tensions. U.S.-China competition risks becoming an end unto itself, fueling overextension abroad and undermining democracy at home. It's not too late for Xi and Biden to find a way back from the brink. Parallels between the Russia-Ukraine war and a potential China-Taiwan conflict as these lessons could give Taiwan a better chance to prevent, deter, or resist a Chinese invasion.
But the fact, U.S. diplomatic capacity – our physical presence, technical mastery, and agility to mobilize resources – is stalled and eroding at the worst possible moment. While the US dithers, China is moving ahead swiftly in global diplomacy with big political and commercial implications that will last decades.There’s debate inside the U.S. about whether China’s mounting challenges will lead it to become more assertive and risk tolerant, particularly relating to Taiwan. Anecdotally, though, there seems to be less anxiety inside the U.S. that China is on an inexorable path to global domination. America remains resilient and capable of continued growth while China is becoming weighed down by its own challenges and mistakes. U.S. might be under-investing in diplomacy.
There are scenarios short of compelling Taiwan directly where there'd likely less military warning. One that deserves analysis is preemptive attack on US forces, not Taiwan initially. The problem is actually Taiwan itself. Very massive spending budget on (projects) soft diplomacy to deter China diplomacy. Very massive (/ provocative) campaign “Two China, Two Systems”. But Taiwan isn't spending 10% or more of its GDP on defense. China is a gigantic superpower that openly targets them for subjugation. And Beijing couldn't be clearer that it will crush Taiwan's freedoms, and probably jail many of them - or worse. Taiwan deserves support but it doesn't look good that it’s military has declined by 2/3rds in manpower since 2010, relies on 4 month conscripts, no ready reserve, buys big-ticket weapons that would be irrelevant in a war, and spends only $17 billion/year on defense.
How Taiwanese politicians and the public understand defense, which isn’t necessarily the same as US advisers do. As an example, one party for decades believed (still believes) the best defense was maintaining good relations with your dangerous neighbor. Big ticket items like fighter jet purchases from the US are nice for showmanship but many experts have correctly noted their value often doesn’t meet their high price tags. It seems this attitude may be changing in Taiwan, perhaps influenced by the invasion of Ukraine. Defense, especially military conscription, has also historically been socially unpopular, due to associations with the long (somewhat warm) Cold War under KMT authoritarianism and the lack of morale in the army as an institution. It’s also not quite fair to describe the Taiwanese as having the capacity to spend. Taiwan has a growing wealth inequality problem, an aging population, and other issues which are also important. It needs to address social and economic issues from the same budget as defense.
Once upon a time, it was a given that the American embassy in a given country, in most countries, was the biggest embassy, the most visible embassy, the most fortress compound,, the most influential embassy. This happened in Jakarta (face to face Indonesia Presidential Palace, and only less than 20 meters besides Jakarta Townhall City). This happened in Berlin (U.S. embassy only meters from Brandenburg Gate). This happened in Canberra. But, that is not the case now in many parts of the world. In much of the developing world, it’s China.
Partisan sniping derails efforts to strengthen the U.S. diplomacy, funding for diplomacy has been flat for a decade, and the US can’t even fill ambassadorships. The Pentagon, meanwhile, gets tens of billions more every year. Thanks for Russia - Ukraine war, next year or maybe 2024, military budget will be 1 Trillion dollar/year. China, on the other hand, has increased its spending on diplomacy, now has more overseas diplomatic posts than the US, and its diplomats are much better trained than they were years ago. Even if China is not the best partner, it at least makes an effort to be a friend to some countries which can barely get any notice from DC.
When it comes to the global faceoff, America’s approach to diplomacy could prove its biggest weakness. If you run a supply chain that is dependent upon China, you need to start finding alternative suppliers. When Xi’s ambitions threaten US strategic interests, your supply chain will be collateral damage. Deglobalization is not a top-down phenomenon or equally distributed. It means new winners (China?) can -- and must -- emerge to disrupt across a whole host of legacy systems: Including “classic” Upstream of X, i.e. the legacy world of production + supply chains already happened in decades at least after World War II.
Xi Jinping was dominant before; he is even more dominant now. New leadership, the 3rd term Xi Jinping and his lineup suggests “it’s not about competence, or a diversity of views, it’s about Xi getting more of what he wants, faster.” One is how bland and anodyne it is for the foreign audience. Xi created a Central National Security Commission to address a broad and newly defined set of threats – political, cultural, and ideological. The Chinese leader called the approach “holistic security,” and its central pillars should surprise nobody: Xi must be at the core of all political and policy decision-making, and only constant political purges can maintain party purity and security.
No one is immune, and a series of senior officials have been forced out (or driven to suicide, in cases such as Gen. Zhang Yang, a former head of the Central Military Commission’s Political Work Department). Even the purgers have been purged, including figures such as Fu Zhenghua, a former deputy minister of public security, and Sun Lijun, formerly vice minister of public security. There is a grim, inexorable logic to this cycle. At some point, each official in charge of safeguarding the party from ideological and political threats will know too much and grow too powerful for Xi’s comfort, necessitating their removal. Such Stalin-style behavior rarely ends well.
The other is that there is not a word of thanks to the dear departed leaders for their loyal services to the Party. First time head of the Ministry of State Security has ever been in either the Central Secretariat or the Politburo. Intel organs are being centralized under Xi in a dangerous way, opening up a greater role for them in domestic politics. Surprising and worrying. Past ministers of state security have typically been seen as political lightweights, without strong factional alignments. Bringing the head of the Ministry of Public Security into the Secretariat is also highly unusual.
First among the congratulatory telegrams landing on Xi Jinping's desk were those from Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un and Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif. “A glowing tribute to his sagacious stewardship and unwavering devotion for serving the people.” Hours ago, via Twitter and Instagram, Indonesia’s Jokowi, host G20 this year (next November), also congratulated him. the division of responsibilities after congress, Xi Jinping (General Party Secretary, State President, CMC chairman), Li Qiang (Premier), Zhao Leji (NPC Head), Wang Huning (CPPCC Head), Cai Qi (Ideology Czar), Ding Xuexiang (Executive VP), and Li Xi (Head of CCD).
Meanwhile, on the other side, encouraged by a Beijing protester’s extremely rare display of courage, young Chinese people are using creative ways to spread anti-Xi messages, protesting censorship, repression and “zero Covid.” Anti-Xi Jinping Posters Are Spreading in China via AirDrop, because feel unsafe using WeChat.
At the same time China National Congress, 2 of 4 members of QUAD, Japan PM Kishida Fumio and Australian PM Anthony Norman Albanese met in Perth. China isn’t happy about Australia’s upgraded security agreement with Japan. Warns it has upset the recent “positive trend” in relations with Australia.
Actually, Labour Australia (Anthony Norman Albanese) is a “warm relation” with China (especially in the Kevin Rudd regime), rather than Liberal Party Australia. Australia and Canada are key targets of China’s influence operations. Whether they like it or not, they aren’t bystanders to China’s growing assertiveness and must continue to strengthen their responses. Currently, Kevin Rudd nominated to be Australian Ambassador for the U.S. North Korea’s missile launches are pushing Japan and South Korea toward more collaboration in the military sphere. Divisions between Tokyo and Seoul are nowhere near resolved, but a common adversary helps kick them down the field a bit. Tokyo loses temper with Seoul (& of course Pyongyang), so Tokyo strengthens with Canberra.
Stability has always been paramount in China, because handling 1,4 billion is very difficult. Not insulted, but actually India, the biggest democracy on earth, has a camouflage scheme, maybe surveillance, to set a stability . Xi however, is making the same error as Mao (& autocrats worldwide.) He's mistaking the consolidation of power for a stabilizing force. China deeply needs reforms, better governance, solutions for economic problems & brewing divisions.
Decades ago, Mao Zedong had no interest in “stabilizing” anything. Quite the contrary - he frequently destabilized both Chinese politics and society as a matter of policy and strategy. “Stability has always been paramount in China” misses a lot about his era. One of several reasons why Xi is no Mao. Xi emphasizes "self-governance." But the key phrase "intra-Party democracy," with a long history in the CCP, was dropped this year for the first time in more than four decades. As Xi Jinping wins big politically, reminder again that Deng Xiaoping considered his greatest achievement to be resisting the temptation to shift to multi-party democracy.
There are bad days in China's markets and then there are days like today (Oct 24th). The worst stock losses since 2008 and all-time low for the offshore yuan. Foreigners sold a record $2.5b of mainland shares. A brutal rebuke of the weekend's news from Beijing. And same day too, new Chinese customs data show that in September, China's trade surplus with the EU rose 25% compared to a year earlier, from $18.5bn to $23.2bn. Understanding that the trade balance is not the best way to measure these things of course. But it doesn't really seem like the rhetoric is being translated into anything numerically measurable yet.
With a gargantuan economy and only can compete with the U.S., Xi Jinping is poised to shepherd both the Chinese Communist Party and the nation into a new and dangerous era. China’s economic deceleration in the coming years. Low growth from a large base will still account for much of global growth, but it will postpone China’s economy reaching parity with the U.S., assuming continued U.S. growth. tech competition remains the most potent sources of Sino-US competition, especially given the radical Biden strategy on IT, chips, semiconductors.
The foundations of China’s “harmonious rise” – public quiescence predicated on sky-high growth – have crumbled. Xi has responded by centralizing power, relying increasingly on the coercive tools of his internal security services to govern. But the Chinese leader’s effort to build a 21st-century police state promises growing internal risk, and this will likely translate into conflict-seeking abroad. Good China analysts must write and publish more. The bad ones are getting too much airtime and their influence is misguiding policy and business.
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Xi Jinping, in past
Xi Jinping, a former Zhejiang Province party boss who became Shanghai’s top cadre seven months ago, says much about the CCP’s delicate factional balance and the behind-the-scenes jockeying. Despite his apparent grip on most levers of power, Hu lacks the authority of a Deng Xiaoping, and thus must strike a balance among the CCP’s major factions regarding the division of spoils at the top. Xi enjoys the backing of incumbent PSC members associated with the Shanghai faction once led by ex-president Jiang Zemin, as well as the majority of party elders.
As the only son of liberal party elder Xi Zhongxun, Xi is also a ranking CCP “Princeling.” The low-key Shanghai party boss is acceptable to Hu partly because the elder Xi was a comrade-in-arms of late liberal party chief Hu Yaobang, Hu’s former mentor. But there is little question that Hu would prefer Li Keqiang to become the only member of what is called the “Fifth Generation” represented on the PSC.
Xi, it is said, is now in line to become vice-president and executive head of the party Secretariat, while Li will most likely get the post of executive vice-premier. Under CCP tradition, Xi would then take over from Hu as party General Secretary and President while Li would assume Wen Jiabao’s job as premier at the 18th Congress in 2012.
The likelihood that factional dynamics will wreak havoc on policymaking has, however, diminished due to significant change in the nature of CCP factions during the past decade. Beginning with the era of ex-president Jiang, most factions no longer divide along ideological lines. Such power blocs are now more concerned with obtaining more senior posts and political resources for their supporters and more economic benefits for the regions they represent and the businesses run by factional affiliates.
Thus, Hu’s Communist Youth League faction is preoccupied with advancing the careers of professional party functionaries who are specialists in areas including ideology, organization, and propaganda. The Shanghai faction, now led by incumbent Standing Committee member and Vice-President Zeng Qinghong, is more interested in preserving the Greater Shanghai Region’s status as the “dragonhead” of China’s economy. This is one reason why Zeng, the principal adviser of Jiang Zemin, has apparently thrown his support behind Xi. While he was party boss of nearby Zhejiang Province, Xi won fame for effectively promoting high-tech private enterprises and advocating the integration of the economies of the Greater Shanghai Region.
The majority of Chinese are more interested in bread-and-butter issues than they are in this game of musical chairs at the top, particularly whether Hu and Wen can fulfil their promise of narrowing the yawning gap between rich and poor, city and countryside, and coast and hinterland.
And evidence of worsening antagonisms among disparate social groupings and classes is mounting. Despite their vaunted credo of “scientific development,” the Hu-Wen leadership has failed to do much to help peasants and migrant workers, who have been hit hard by staggeringly high property prices, unaffordable health care, and rising education costs.
Wen’s cabinet, moreover, has failed to tame inflation, particularly for foodstuffs ranging from eggs to pork. The official consumer price index rose by 6.5% in August, but some Western economists calculate that the inflation rate is closer to 10%. This has prompted many urban residents to go on a buying spree, pushing prices higher.
Moreover, many of Hu’s protégés who are provincial party secretaries have compromised records in areas ranging from public health to environmental protection. While serving as governor and party boss of Henan Province in the 1990’s, Li Keqiang failed to do much for the estimated one million peasants who contracted AIDS by selling blood to supplement their meager earnings. Li Yuanchao, another rising star in Hu’s faction, neglected environmental issues in Jiangsu, the rich province he has run since 2000. Earlier this year, huge, foul-smelling blooms of blue algae contaminated drinking water from “Jiangsu’s Jewel,” Lake Tai.
Hu has already rejected petitions by Party veterans calling on the CCP to liberalize more rapidly. Indeed, it is likely that Hu will steer clear of political reform in his message to the Congress, instead promising more “trickle-down” funds for social welfare and the poor. But, as at the 16th Congress five years ago, bona fide farmers and workers will be absent, while an increasingly tribalized Party will focus on reconciling its intense factional competition.
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